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Strengthening What Remains
Christine Zuni,

Introduction
Tribal courts exist primarily to advance
tribal people. However, as the historical development of tribal courts illustrates, this "service" was not always intended to serve the
interests of the tribal community in preserving
its own concepts of law. This was due to the
various political and social agendas being pursued by the federal government through the use
of tribal courts, none of which were particularly sensitive to the native world view or philosophy. As tribal courts enter into a new period
of development, we are at an opportune
moment to critically appraise our systems and
evaluate them using native ideals and taking
into consideration the native world view. It is
the particular responsibility of native lawyers,
practitioners, professionals, and advocates
working within the tribal justice systems to
assess the current situation of tribal courts and
to determine the future course of tribal systems.
Preserving, strengthening and incorporating our native concepts of justice, which
include both native principles and laws as well
as traditional methods and objectives of dispute resolution, are of particular importance in
the appraisal of our tribal court systems. To the
extent that tribal nations are similar, mutual
exchange among them is useful; to the extent
that tribal nations are different, this evaluation
must be carried out on a tribal level. It is the
intent of this paper to encourage that localized
evaluation. This appraisal will consider the
effect reliance on non-Indian law, both in the
I.

past and the present by tribal courts and
lawyers, has had and continues to have on
Indian nations.
The entire area of customary law, including methods of traditional dispute resolution, is
currently a "high profile" area receiving attention from legal experts and researchers.
Customary law is extremely important to the
future development of tribal justice systems.
Those involved in the tribal judicial systems
must begin to articulate their thoughts on, and
address customary law. Courts in Indian country and the individuals involved in those courts
play an influential role in controlling the extent
to which the legal systems will embody customary law. All those involved in the judicial
field at the tribal level, from lay people to legal
professionals, must become involved in this
discussion. The use and development of customary law in our legal system rises or falls on
the position taken by the judiciary, the advocates and the litigants. Despite all the helpful
insights which may be gained from legal
anthropologists and historians, tribal people
are the ones familiar with the realities. We can
distinguish the rhetoric from the practical truth,
the ideal from the practice. And most imporChristine Zuni is an Assistant Professor of Law and
Director of the Southwest Indian Law Clinic,
University of New Mexico School of Law. This
paper is based on a preliminary paper delivered at
the Indigenous Justice Conference: Justice On
Indian Concepts, a conference hosted by the Pueblo
of Santa Clara and sponsored by Southwest
Intertribal Court ofAppeals and the Office of Indian
Affairs in Santa Fe, New Mexico. December 8, 1993.
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tantly, we are the ones who, because we are
most familiar with the problems, are instrumental in pointing to the practical solutions
and methods which will succeed.
We find ourselves at a juncture in the
development of our tribal court systems.
Therefore, we need to take a moment to cast
our thoughts over what has passed and why
things have developed as they have. In this
respect, it is critical to remember the history of
tribal judicial systems development. As tribal
courts expand their jurisdiction and develop, it
is necessary not only to envision a destination,
but also to change course if necessary to avoid
the development of tribal justice systems by
default. We must see to their future development by design. My ultimate vision is to see
tribal justice systems develop into true indigenous justice systems, distinct from all others.
To the extent that Indian nations are under real,
or imagined, mandates to demonstrate some
conformity, this can be accomplished without
discarding or ignoring their own wisdom.
This paper is intended to encourage discussion and stimulate action and thought as
well as to support the ongoing work in tribal
courts in this area. We are involved in an ongoing process of developing an indigenous body
of law and system ofjustice. We must pay particular attention to how we are going about the
development of our court systems and look
closely at what is developing. Incorporating
customary law, whether wholly or partially,
into our developing legal systems makes them
truly unique to our individual tribes and reflective of the concepts we, as Indian people, have
of law and justice.
The first question is how do we go about
doing this? There is no simple or easy answer.
The first step is to begin consciously thinking

about it, talking about it and identifying those
elements in our current systems where we have
already incorporated principles of customary
law and identifying other specific areas where
we can incorporate the principles of customary
law. The second step is to look at our systems
to see where they are not meeting the needs of
the community and to seek to incorporate
methods which will more effectively meet
those needs. As we look for viable methods,
we should look first at tribal concepts and principles of dispute resolution which may assist in
this effort and which complement our way of
thought before we import other methods from
outside. We should also look to adapt those
methods which we import, or are mandated to
follow, to fit our communities. I hope to
encourage serious reflection on the present
state of our court systems. Do such systems
reflect native principles and values? Do they
seek to incorporate and reinforce basic and
important community values? Given the federal government's historic, and even its fairly
recent agenda for tribal courts, a negative
answer to this question is not surprising.
However, I do not believe it is the intention of
any tribal court system to merely mimic the
Anglo-American system without thinking
about developing a unique tribal justice system. There are enough similarities among
tribes that we can discuss this matter collectively, yet the answers are as varied as the
tribes themselves and thus lie within the tribal
communities, not outside them. Once tribal
people entered the legal profession, the move
to turn the tribal justice system into our own
tool began. My vision for tribal courts is the
development of systems of justice which
reflect the native society's concepts of law and
harmony. While it is true that tribes are uncer-
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II. Legal History ( of Tribal Courts
tain federal mandates, 2 there are ways of meetA. General O 'erview
ing those mandates while still maintaining tribThe history of tribal dispute resolution
al integrity in the design of the dispute resolupredates both state and federal courts. This
tion system.
history is as differen t from the history of state
From the beginning of contact to this day,
and federal courts as the Indian culture and
we have faced the challenge of maintaining our
value system are di fferent from the dominant
ways. All of us here today face this common
culture and its valu e system. The history of
challenge in the development of our court systribal courts is domi nated by the federal-tribal
we
States
United
in
the
people
As
native
tems.
relationship.
have a long history of resistance to the destrucWhile it may b e said that all tribes have
tion of the ways of our people, and we have
their own unique his tory, generally the history
learned some hard lessons.
of the development of tribal court systems is
Recalling the history of tribal courts
similar. In addition to the tribal court systems
reminds us of the heavy hand of the federal
that we will speak o f, several tribes, including
government upon these systems and should
several of the Pueblos of
prompt a critical examiNew
Mexico, operate
nation of the present state
of our systems.
We The history of tribaldispute reso- entirely within a "traditional" system. A mirror
should view critical evaluation as pure survival lution predates both state andfed- to reflect the AngloAmerican jurisprudence
instinct. Before we make
eral courts
model, whether in whole
plans to move forward,
or in part, is missing; it
we must determine where
has never been there.
we are and where we
Under
such
tribal
systems
the methods and the
have been.
ends of dispute resolution differ.3 In the case of
In the remainder of this paper, I will
non-traditional tribal courts, federal law interbriefly review the legal history of tribal courts,
jected Anglo-American laws and concepts irrethen look at the terms that are used when we
spective of the difference between traditional
law and Anglo-American law and the gulf
speak of developing justice systems based on
Indian concepts. I then look at the importance
between the two.4 Recognizing that a gulf
world view plays in developing judicial sysexists is the first step towards understanding
tems for tribal communities and the effect on
the impact Anglo-American law and its conIndian nations that tribal courts and tribal
cepts ofjustice has had on native peoples. This
lawyers have when they use non-Indian law.
sobering recognition is also instrumental to
Lastly, I make some practical suggestions in
comprehend the challenges facing modem day
moving toward the establishment and incorpotribal court systems, structured in the Angloration of native principles of law into tribal
American mode, struggling to remain relevant
courts.
to, or at least respectful of, native social and
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political thought. Interestingly, a similar challenge faces traditional systems, as they seek to
maintain traditional aspects of their systems,
while "modernizing" their operations to meet
increased and changing demands. External
mandates premised on the Anglo-American
jurisprudential model of justice press on these
5
systems as well.
B. History
Prior to 1871, when treaty-making with
tribes ended, the federal policy was one of
respect for tribal self-government and traditional forms of tribal justice. Congress recognized this right through treaties. Tribes
retained sole jurisdiction over Indians and concurrent jurisdiction over criminal conduct by
non-Indians. In Worcester v. Georgia,6 the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the
state of Georgia had no jurisdiction over
Indians within Indian country, unless Congress
expressly authorized it. There was no limitation on tribes in terms of their ability to use traditional forms of judgments, i.e., restitution,
banishment, and death.
From 1871 to 1934 the federal policy was
to end tribal self-governance. This was the
7
period in which the General Allotment Act,
was enacted and Indian lands were divided into
individual holdings, with the remainder opened
to settlement, and Indians subjected to state
law. In 1883, Courts of Indian Offenses were
created to replace tribal forums of justice. The
purpose of these courts was to educate and civilize the tribes with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and later, Congress providing the funding for the courts.8 During this period, traditional tribal law was seriously weakened, los-

ing its authority to a Bureau of Indian Affairs
legal order composed of the Indian agent, a
"code of indian offenses," Indian police, and
agency-appointed chiefs and judges. 9 In 1885,
Congress passed the Major Crimes Act,' 0 to
extend federal court jurisdiction over felony
criminal offenses committed by Indians on
Indian reservations. Congress was spurred by
Ex Parte Crow Dog I in which Crow Dog, the
accused murderer of Spotted Tail (both Brule
Sioux) was tried for murder and convicted in
the First District Court of Dakota, Dakota
Territory, and sentenced to death.
The
Supreme Court found the district court to be
without jurisdiction, finding Crow Dog was
subject to the jurisdiction of his tribe and not to
the United States or its general laws. The traditional remedy included reconciliation and an
ordered gift. 12 In Talton v. Mayes, 13 the Court
found that the Bill of Rights under the United
States Constitution, providing protections for
criminal defendants, did not apply to tribal
criminal proceedings. This was the precursor
to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.14 The
effect of this period was the weakening of traditional governments and law, as well as the
loss of 90 million acres of tribal land to nonIndians from the date the General Allotment
Act was passed to 1934.
From 1934 to 1953, the federal policy
sought to restore tribal self-government, which
included the creation of tribal courts. The
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)' 5 was passed
by Congress in 1934 to accomplish this purpose. Under the Act, tribes could adopt written
constitutions. Model constitutions were provided and contained provisions whereby tribal
councils could create tribal courts to replace
Courts of Indian Offenses. Many tribes adopt-
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ed these model constitutions. Not all tribes
which organized under the IRA adopted constitutions and a number of tribes did not organize
under the IRA.
The model constitutions and
model codes limited criminal jurisdiction of
tribal courts to minor offenses, subjected laws
and ordinances to Interior Department
approval, and limited sentencing powers of
tribal courts to a maximum period of six
months imprisonment for criminal offenses.
From 1953 to 1968, the federal policy was
to terminate the federal trust responsibility and
transfer jurisdiction to states. One purpose of
the policy was to eliminate tribal courts.
Although most tribes and their court systems
survived termination, tribal councils were discouraged from efforts to develop more effective tribal courts. The structure of courts
remained unchanged and tribes were forced to
bear greater funding burdens. Congress also
passed Public Law 28016 which allowed state
courts to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction
over Indians within Indian country without
tribal consent. Williams v. Lee 17 upheld tribal
court jurisdiction in non-Public Law 280 states
over civil disputes by non-Indians and Indians
within Indian country. Tribal court criminal
jurisdiction remained limited. Yet, federal
jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act and
the General Crimes Act' s was not vigorously
exercised. The tribal codes developed by the
Interior Department and adopted by tribes
remained basically unchanged since 1934.
In 1968, the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA) was passed and the federal policy of
recognizing tribal powers of self-government,
including the authority to establish court systems for administering justice, was once again
reaffirmed. The Indian Civil Rights Act, how-

ever, provided no federal funding to enable
tribes to restructure or improve their court systems. Moreover, it permitted federal courts to
review by writ of habeas corpus the legality of
detention by order of an Indian tribe. The Act
required tribal courts to afford criminal defendants many of the basic due process rights
made applicable to federal and state courts
under the United States Constitution. It placed
requirements on tribal self-government which
19
reflect Anglo-American principles of justice.
The Act also limits the sentencing power of
tribal courts for criminal offenses to one year
or a $5,000 fine upon conviction.
From 1968 to the present,
the
Congressional policy has been to promote tribal self-government and increase funding for
court operations. However, many courts are
currently operating on tribal and federal funds
which are not nearly comparable to similarly
situated state courts. Tribal courts are underfunded and understaffed because many tribes
lack funds to adequately supplement federal
funds to assist courts with the development of
the court system and expanded tribal jurisdiction. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions
have taken criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians and non-member Indians from tribal
courts at a time when both live, work and are
routinely present on reservations. 2 Criminal
jurisdiction over non-member Indians was
restored by Congressional amendment to the
Indian Civil Rights Act in 1992. Some tribes
prosecute major crimes listed under the Major
Crimes Act due to the lack of federal enforcement.
The United States Supreme Court recently
found a tribal court lacked jurisdiction over a
civil dispute between non-Indians in Indian
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country. Many tribes have amended their tribal codes, moving away from the Code of Indian
Offenses and the IRA model codes, but some
still employ codes whose major criminal and
civil provisions have not changed since they
were first adopted under the IRA.
In 1993, President Clinton signed tribal
courts legislation into law.2 1 The legislation
provided for federal appropriations to be made
available to tribal courts for their exclusive use.
Tribes still await these appropriations.
A central proposition in federal Indian law
governing tribal nations, and hence tribal judicial systems, is that Indian nations retain vestiges of their original sovereignty and therefore
have residual authority to govern their own
affairs. Their sovereign qualities were initially
recognized by the federal government when it
negotiated treaties with Indian nations as it did
with other foreign nations. Thus, the power to
establish and maintain tribal judicial systems is
an inherent, retained power that was never surrendered.
III. Terms
Some of the terms used to discuss the
development of justice systems based on
Indian concepts follow. Because these terms
are used interchangeably, I would like to
attempt here to comment on them so that we
will have a common understanding of the different terms. In reference to the law of native
societies, commonly used terms are: customary
law, tribal common law, indigenous law, and
native law. In reference to traditional tribal
methods of resolving disputes; traditional dispute resolution, peacemaking and peacekeeping are common terms. Custom, tradition, and

practice are widely used to refer to the source
of both the law of native societies and the
methods of dispute resolutions.
A.

Customary law, common law,
indigenous law and native law
All four of these terms refer to the same
concept. However, in this category I have my
own preference. Because common law is so
closely associated in my legal-trained mind
with the common law of England, I prefer
using customary law, indigenous law, or native
law.
Generally, customary law is a law that is
derived from custom. Custom in this sense
means a long-established usage or practice
which is considered unwritten law. Some additional requirements are that it has acquired the
force of law by common adoption or acquiescence, and that it does not vary.
B.

Traditional dispute resolution,
peacemaking and peacekeeping
Traditional dispute resolution refers to the
methods of resolving disputes which were used
by tribes prior to the existence of tribal courts.
Peacemaking, a term used by particular tribes,
i.e., the Navajo and the Iroquois, is a method of
traditional dispute resolution.
C. Custom, tradition, practice and
usage
Custom, as we use it in the discussions
regarding justice based on Indian concepts, has
the same narrow meaning as defined above;
that is, long-established practices considered as
unwritten law. The general meaning of custom
includes those usages or practices common to
many peoples or to a particular place as well as
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to the whole body of usages, practices or conventions that regulate social life. It is important however, to keep in mind the narrow definition which we use here.
Tradition is the method by which information and beliefs and customs are handed down
by word of mouth or by example from one generation to another without written instruction.
It also refers to the cultural continuity in social
attitudes and institutions or to the pattern of
thought or action passed down from generation
to generation. In this sense, tradition may be
said to refer more to the methods of resolving
disputes and the methods by which native law
is passed from one generation to the next.
Practice and usage are generally used to
describe custom, and so are, in essence, interchangeable with the word, custom.
This is only a cursory examination of these
words and their usage. As these words are
used interchangeably, it is hoped that this will
assist our communication. They are also
English words. The meaning of "law" in the
indigenous language is also important to consider.
IV. World View and Tribal Court
Development
The historical use and incorporation of
non-Indian law has had negative effects on the
development of judicial systems which are
compatible with native societal concepts. The
fact remains, however, that the AngloAmerican approach to law is pervasive in most
tribal court systems. Yet, the question why
tribes would consider altering judicial concepts
embodied in the Anglo-American system of
justice, will arise. The answer is simple.
Native and non-native societies operate from
two different world views. The Anglo-

American system represents the world view of
Anglo-Americans. It is embedded in English
history and law. Consequently, it should not be
considered odd for Indian people to develop a
system which is reflective of the native world
view, embedded in native history and law.
In comparing the general concepts of justice held by indigenous people of North
America to the concepts of the AngloAmerican system, I want to point out the fundamental differences in legal precepts or concepts that exist between indigenous concepts of
law and relationships and Western or AngloAmerican concepts of justice. The challenge
Indian nations face today is developing justice
systems which are relevant to the people and
which meet community needs, and most
importantly do not unilaterally substitute
Western principles for indigenous concepts.
From initial contact native peoples experienced conflict in legal principles with the various colonizers. For example: with respect to
the ownership of land, the native concept was
that one cannot buy and sell the land; native
law was oral and theirs written; many native
societies were matrilineal while the colonizers'
societies were patrilineal. Unless differences
in world view are articulated, it is difficult both
to understand clearly the struggle in developing a native justice system within a system
modeled after the Anglo-American system and
to devise a method to do so. The displacement
of native concepts and principles by the use
and adoption of non-Indian law by Indian
nations also becomes clearer by articulating the
differences. The differences between indigenous views of justice and Anglo-American
views of justice are fundamental. There are
many different tribes, many different languages, yet there are some general principles
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and common threads within our indigenous
systems of justice.
A.

A comparison of Anglo-American
and Indigenous law

See Appendix A.
B.

The Effects of Use of Non-Indian
Law
The greatest danger in using non-Indian
law is that since it is not law that has evolved
from native peoples themselves, it advances
non-Indian approaches which do not necessarily provide the best way to resolve disputes
handle crimes and violations for a native community. A gulf between native people and nonIndian law occurs where non-Indian law introduces or reinforces views which are contrary to
accepted values or precepts of the community.
The Anglo-American system is in itself contradictory to native values in restoring harmony.
Thus, the effectiveness of the methods and the
law applied by the tribal judicial system in alleviating the problems it is responsible for
addressing can be undermined by influence of
Anglo-American principles. Courts and tribal
lawyers must consider the difference between
the federal and state governments and their
approach to justice, and that of tribal governments in relation to the people they serve.
While there are some similarities, there are also
significant differences in terms of economic
resources, function and philosophy.
To the extent that tribal justice systems
pattern themselves, not only in structure but in
the law applied in their systems, after federal
and state court systems, they surrender their
own unique concepts of native law and participate, at a certain level, in their own ethnocide.

Law is a significant part of all cultures and to
the extent that Anglo-American concepts displace native concepts, native culture is
changed. The use of non-Indian law perpetuates and interjects a way of thinking which
should be carefully considered. While it may
seem difficult to consider and argue cases
based on a tribal perspective, this is the only
way tribes can develop their own unique
jurisprudence. If non-Indian law is not automatically used by tribal courts, or turned to as
providing the definitive answer on all aspects
of the law, Indian concepts will emerge.
Some would argue that there are reasons
for the use of non-Indian law and that tribal
courts are legitimized if they look and act like
non-Indian courts. Non-Indian parties and
lawyers are more comfortable in or with a system they can recognize. Others say that traditional law is too difficult or too controversial to
apply.
Legitimization should not come at such a
high price. Differences are to be expected by
parties and lawyers when going into another
jurisdiction. It is time that we begin to rethink
the structure and foundational principles of
tribal judicial systems and to infuse the tribal
system with our own concepts of justice which
more closely reflect our societal beliefs.
VI. Practical Considerations
A. The Importance of Incorporating
Customary Law Ways into Tribal
Judicial Systems
Many tribal Constitutions and Codes mandate that custom and tradition be utilized by the
tribal court. These provisions vary, but the
majority of these provisions are quite strong
regarding the preeminence that custom and tradition are to be given by the judiciary when
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considering matters before them. Even if no
written provisions exist, recognition of the customary law of the tribe by the judiciary is possible.
Customary law is oral and primarily preserved in the native language. The predominance of English and the increasing number of
tribal peoples who only speak English, the -use
of English in the tribal court and the employment of persons external to the tribe as judges
and advocates within tribal systems has diminished the use of native languages. This in turn
affects the way in which thoughts and ideas are
expressed. In integrating and relying on traditional law, courts and parties are likely to find
themselves caught between English and the
native language, unless everyone before the
court is conversant in the native language.
This raises at least two issues. One is insuring
that a place is made for the use of native language in tribal court systems. The court has a
responsibility to insure that qualified translators are available and utilized by the court for
the benefit of both English and native speakers.
The second issue is the interdisciplinary aspect
of developing a court system based on native
principals and traditional law. The court and
lawyers must and should be working with others in the community who are recognized for
their knowledge of the native language, of the
history of the people, and of the legal traditions
and teachings. In order to bring traditional law
into the court, oral interviews and fieldwork
may be required. It is important to recognize
the work required in developing a tribal system
which seeks to utilize traditional law. The
work is slow and painstaking, with many
detractors requiring great commitment, not
only on the part of those involved in the court
system, but of the leadership and the commu-

nity. While outside forces and societal changes
have impacted custom, it is important to distinguish between disuse of custom and custom
which simply has not been recognized, but
which, in fact, remains alive and intact.
The judiciary and advocates appearing
before the court must use custom responsibly
and must assume certain ethical obligations in
its use. For instance, an advocate should be
under the same obligation to report to the court
both the favorable and unfavorable customary
law on a particular matter, in the same manner
they are responsible for reporting favorable
and unfavorable case law. In addition, both the
judiciary as well as the advocates should bear
responsibility to search out applicable customary law before advocating or applying outside
law.
The application of customary law to members of the tribe and non-members is a particularly important issue. Some courts decide
whether it would be appropriate to apply customary law to tribal members based on their
status as traditional, and on their bicultural or
assimilated status. They also make a distinction between members and non-members. This
is an interesting distinction which I will
address below.
A great deal of responsibility for the
development of customary law as a solid foundation of tribal law lies with the tribal court
system, primarily the judiciary and the parties
before the court. The responsibility for the
articulation and pronunciation of customary
law lies with the judiciary, but I contend that
the responsibility of presenting customary law
to be considered by the courts belongs to the
litigants.
The premise I begin with is that all tribes
and their courts apply and draw upon custom-
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ary law to some extent. Many, as they apply it
in decision making, may not stop to label it as
such. This is what I want to stress here: the
need for the tribal judiciary to consciously document its use, articulate it when applied 22 and
request parties to address customary law, and
where it is applicable, to present customary law
to the court. Applying customary law is not
always easy for tribal court judges. It is often
easier to apply state or federal law because it is
written and because Western legal training
leads us in that direction. On the other hand,
because Indian tribes are oral societies, the customary law is contained in the oral tradition of
the tribe. It is not written down. It is typically
not codified. The sources of common law are
the members of tribal society who were raised
traditionally. In addition, non-legal research
materials may provide information, as well as
the personal experience and observation of
community members. Western legal training
does not necessarily prepare lawyers, both
native and non-native, for this aspect of tribal
court advocacy or judging.
How can the native court develop and
encourage the use of customary law? One,
courts can develop their own unique rules for
customary law when it is at issue, or develop
their own unique interpretation of the rules of
evidence used by courts to accommodate the
nature of customary law which might otherwise make it difficult or cumbersome to apply.
Two, the court can call its own experts on customary law if customary law will assist the
court to understand evidence, (i.e., significant
acts which symbolize something according to
custom, such as paternity, or to determine a fact
in issue, such as whether there was a marriage),
or when customary law is in dispute. Basically

judges have a great deal of flexibility when
they believe customary law will assist in
understanding evidence or determining a fact
in issue or when the judge needs expert guidance on what the customary law is.
Courts might want to consider developing
unique rules or provisions which encourage the
introduction of customary law, and clearly set
out how customary law is to be addressed and
presented to the court.
B.

When Customary Law is Not at
Issue
When customary law is not at issue, i.e.,
where the custom is so widely known and
accepted in the community, the court may consider recognizing the customary law on its
own. This is known as judicial notice under
the rules of evidence used by Anglo-American
courts. The limitations on judicial notice generally apply only to adjudicative facts and
exclude propositions of generalized knowledge
under which common law rules are formulated.
Tribal courts could set forth customary law not
in dispute and widely known and accepted
through its rulings. Indeed recognition of customary law by constitution or code is strong
support, if not a strong mandate to do so.
C. Encouraging Use of Customary
Law by Litigants
Because the court must be assisted by litigants in the development of customary law, the
court might consider adopting unique rules
which require litigants to plead the applicability or inapplicability of customary law, and
require them to address relevant customary
law, just as relevant state and federal law is
routinely argued. Litigants would thus be
required to determine whether customary law
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exists on a given matter, what that customary
law is, and whether or not it is applicable and
why it is or why it is not applicable.

law, customary law will give way to other
influences, such as state and federal law devoid
of indigenous thought.

D. Role of the Legislature
One of the roles of the tribal legislature is
to provide for the use and development of customary law through legislation and to fund or
support research of customary law at the tribal
level. Codification of customary law is sometimes discussed, but the major emphasis is on
assisting courts in its recognition. Because
codification of customary law is not necessarily the answer, by incorporating customary law
into legislation, its relationship to the oral tradition is changed. The primary method
through which customary law will become a
part of the tribal legal system is through the
development of judge-made law and through
the legislature's use of traditional legal concepts and precepts as the basis for legislation.
The tribe itself however, must affirmatively decide that incorporation of customary law
is desirable and encourage its use by considering its application itself as a foundation to its
legislation. How much customary law will be
incorporated will vary from tribe to tribe.

E Application of Customary Law 23
The application of customary law need not
be limited to the indigenous population. If a
comparison is made to the application of
English common law, nowhere has its application been limited to only a certain group of
people but has instead applied to all. Likewise,
application of tribal customary law should
know no distinctions among groups of people
24
within the tribal jurisdictional boundaries.
Where the customary law of two separate
tribes come into conflict, say for example, due
to intermarriage, the principles to resolve conflicts of law could be applied, or developed by
25
the tribal court itself.

E. Participation by the Judiciary
Participation and interest of judges in
incorporating customary law is critical. If
there is no interest or if there is resistance on
the part of the judiciary, incorporation of customary law and development of an indigenous
body of law unique to a particular tribe will be
minimal. The process of incorporating customary law into a formal legal system will not
be easy and will take the work of the judiciary,
the litigants, and the tribe. If an active
approach is not taken to support customary

VII. Conclusion
Individual tribes face the challenge to
develop an indigenous system of justice based
on Indian concepts. Tribes do so in the face of
imposed mandates, yet the spirit of resistance
is alive. As judges, lawyers and professionals
working within the tribal justice systems, or as
tribal leaders we need to assure the responsibility for preserving the strength and good that
is in our indigenous thought and refuse to
blindly mirror the Anglo-American model.
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Anglo-American

Indigenous

Adversarial
One party against another; One party prevails.

Non-Adversarial
All come together to work out an answer.

Argue
Points of law, points of fact argued against one another.
Points of disagreement are focused.
Only those with standing may participate.

Talk
Everyone talks, events are related from each point of
view. Non-parties may speak.

Rights of Individuals
Paramount; Much care is taken to protect individual rights.

Rights of Community
Paramount; Emphasis in indigenous communities is on
the group rather than on the self or individual.

Vindication of Society
In criminal matters emphasis is on vindicating the matter
for society, little emphasis on victim or reintegrating
accused.

Restoration of Peace
In community and resolution of underlying problem -goal of indigenous justice.

Punishment/lImprisonment

ForgivenesslReintegration
No imprisonment (Banishment, shame, ridicule).

Rights of Accused
Right to remain silent. Ability to deny accusation with
burden of proof to be borne by accusers.

Obligation of Accused
Obliged to speak. Honesty in all parties. Seeking truth.
All speak. Through rendition of facts, the evidence
speaks for itself. No burden or reversal of burden.

Fine to State

Restitution to Victim Harmed

Separation of Church and State
Law is secular matter. Law is separate from religion.

Law is part of whole
Spiritual matters are not separated out from the secular.

English Language
Many words cannot be translated into native language,
because there is no equivalent thought.

Native Language
Many words cannot be translated to English, because
there is no equivalent thought. Language carries our
world view.

Emphasis on Written Record
Law is written and must constantly be updated.

Oral
Indigenous societies are oral societies. Words are alive.
Law (custom) is passed orally.

Separate Judicial Body

Traditional, customary leaders participate.

Right to Appeal

No Right to Appeal
Final resolution of matter is sought.

Strengthening What Remains
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piercing self-examination of their imported system which
inspired many of the thoughts expressed in this paper.
Special thanks to my colleagues at the 1995 Boulder
People of Color Conference where this paper was presented as awork in progress and to Professors Margaret
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